Cryptographic protocols for electronic voting essay
Which countries use electronic voting machines
The three phases are detailed as follows. The Combining Entity, who does not have any private key, decrypts the votes by combining decryption shares, which are generated by each entity E i, after which the votes are counted and the tally is published. Election officials should also describe the mechanism that performs the actual verification. In Section 3 the proposed protocol is presented. General Principle Most of the classic e-voting protocols work like this: Voters receive a token, in the form of a ballot that they will modify according to their voting choice. An NIZK proof is a rather complex and incredibly powerful cryptographic object: in our case it allows a voter to prove that their ciphertext is either an encryption of 0 or of 1, but without leaking any information on the encrypted value. Voting officials combine the encrypted ballots in order to get an encrypted tally. First, the most obvious: You want to verify that ballots are counted as cast, meaning that everyone should be able to verify the final tally is the correct count of the ballots cast by the voters. But how do we find a homomorphic encryption scheme? These are the principles put forward in the foundational research by Chaum, Neff, and others in the early s. In the setup stage the key pairs to be used during the voting and counting phases are generated.
Each entity broadcasts and receives specific information by using Shamir's secret-sharing scheme in order to generate its public and private shares [ 15 ]. Secure Verification What do we expect from a secure voting system?
An NIZK proof is a rather complex and incredibly powerful cryptographic object: in our case it allows a voter to prove that their ciphertext is either an encryption of 0 or of 1, but without leaking any information on the encrypted value.
Second, you want any voter to be able to verify that their vote was counted, and represents their voting intention.
The security of the proposed protocol is based on these intractable problems. Voting officials combine the encrypted ballots in order to get an encrypted tally.
More generally, NIZK proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier that some statement is true by sending only a bunch of data with no other interactions. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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